display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
14 ideas
3797 | I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Control is the ultimate criterion of the self: I am the sum total of the parts I control directly. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This looks awfully like a flagrant self-contradiction, and I think it is. It seems pretty obvious that there is at least a distinction between the bit or bits that do the controlling, and the bits that get controlled. |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: An excellent reason for keeping the word 'person' out of ethics is that it is usually so thinly defined that it cannot generate any sense of 'good person'. If a person is just a self-conscious being, what would count as a good or bad one? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9 n20) | |
A reaction: A nice point. Locke's concept of a person (rational self-conscious being) lacks depth and individuality, and Hitler fulfils the criteria as well as any saint. But if Hitler wasn't a 'bad person', what was he bad at being? |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Many people are comfortable taking the pragmatic approach to night/day, living/nonliving and mammal/premammal, but get anxious about the same attitude to having a self and not having a self. It must be All or Nothing, and One to a Customer. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 13.2) | |
A reaction: Personally I think I believe in the existence of the self, but I also agree with Dennett. I greatly admire his campaign against All or Nothing thinking, which is a relic from an earlier age. A partial self could result from infancy or brain damage. |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
Full Idea: An important step towards becoming a person is the step up from a first-order intentional system to a second-order system (which has beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires). | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Call it 'meta-thought'. I agree. Dennett thinks language is crucial to this, but the hallmark of intelligence and full-blown personhood is meta- and meta-meta-thought. Maybe the development of irony is a step up the evolutionary scale. Sarcasm is GOOD. |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Like the biological self, the psychological or narrative self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 13.1) | |
A reaction: Does Dennett have empirical evidence for this claim? It seems to me perfectly possible that there is a real thing called the 'self', and it is the central controller of the brain (involving propriotreptic awareness, understanding, and will). |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Selves are not independently existing soul-pearls, but artefacts of the social processes that create us, and, like other such artefacts, subject to sudden shifts in status. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 13.2) | |
A reaction: "Soul-pearls" is a nice phrase for the Cartesian view, but there can something between soul-pearls and social constructs. Personally I think the self is a development of the propriotreptic (body) awareness that even the smallest animals must possess. |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control and self-definition is telling stories, and more particularly concocting and controlling the story we tell others - and ourselves - about who we are. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 13.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to suggest that there is someone who wants to protect themselves, and who wants to tell the stories, and does tell the stories. No one can deny the existence of this autobiographical element in our own identity. |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The effect of our string of personal narratives is to encourage the audience to (try to) posit a unified agent whose words they are, about whom they are: in short, to posit a centre of narrative gravity. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 13.1) | |
A reaction: What would be the evolutionary advantage of getting the audience to posit a non-existent self, instead of a complex brain? It might be simpler than that, since we say of a bird "it wants to do x". What is "it"? Some simple thing, like a will. |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Who's in charge of the brain? First one coalition and then another, shifting in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-habits that tend to entrain coherent, purposeful sequences rather than an interminable helter-skelter power grab. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 8.1) | |
A reaction: This is probably the best anti-ego account available. Dennett offers our sense of self as a fictional autobiography, but the sense of a single real controller is very powerful. If I jump at a noise, I feel that 'I' have lost control of myself. |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right. |
3800 | You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG] |
Full Idea: If a brain implant would compel you to perform an action which you in fact freely choose, then you are free, but couldn't have done otherwise. | |
From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §6.1) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3803 | Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Can I even conceive of beings whose wills are freer than our own? | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3) |
3791 | Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The creature who is not only sensitive to patterns in its environment, but also sensitive to patterns in its own reactions to patterns in its environment, has taken a major step. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §2.2) |
3794 | Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Foreknowledge is what permits control. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.2) |