display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of wh9ch psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 1916. 2 Sep), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 58 Intro | |
A reaction: This is to treat the self as a phenomenon of thought, rather than of a human being. So if a machine could think, would it hence necessarily have a metaphysical self? |
2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.632) | |
A reaction: Interesting. We must not confuse epistemology with ontology, but the perceived world exists between two limits - the farthest reaches of my perceptions, and the farthest reaches of myself. I wish I could clearly disentangle the nearer border. Dasein? |
5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: As the word is normally used, it can't be said of me at all that I 'know' I am in pain; what is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain? | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §246) | |
A reaction: This raises the question of whether self-consciousness implies self-knowledge, and suggests that it doesn't. All our normal talk of knowledge requires some sort of reliable justification of beliefs, and we can't drop that in the case of self-knowledge. |
22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
Full Idea: 'I' is used as a subject in 'I am in pain', ....and used as an object in 'I am bleeding'. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (The Blue and Brown Notebooks [1936], pp. 66-7) by Colin McGinn - Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals 4 | |
A reaction: How about 'my wound is painful'? Does that have the logical form of a conversation? This idea is incorrect. Shoemaker (1968) suggests that the subjective use is immune to error, unlike the object use. |
23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Therre is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5421) | |
A reaction: This seems to endorse Descartes' claim about the essential unity of the mind. I think Hume is in the background of LW's thought. Presumably the psychologist offered a 'composite' view. Prior discussion of belief leads into this remark. |