display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| Full Idea: We have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire; as everyone daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty, ..which is (as I think improperly) call'd 'free will'. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.47) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a feeble defence of free will, since we have no idea of the origin of the decision not to act according to some desire. I see no sign of free will in introspection, despite what some people claim. |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| Full Idea: A man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.24) | |
| A reaction: Not quite an answer to the big problem, but an interesting observation for those who have high hopes of a truly, deeply and extensively free will. |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.14) | |
| A reaction: He is suggesting the 'free will' is a category mistake, but why shouldn't a power have a power? Magnetism can be strong, or focused. He is ducking the question of what ultimately controls the will. |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| Full Idea: So far as his power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. ..We can scarcely imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.21) | |
| A reaction: It take this approach, which Hume echoes, to be ducking the metaphysical problem, of where the act of willing originates. Locke goes on to admit this. |