Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Aristotle, Chrysippus and Bernard Williams

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22 ideas

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
3238 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
3239 You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22528 The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
571 Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7946 The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
5266 It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
8007 Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
12961 For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
4118 A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
22506 A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
20834 Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
22504 Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
20192 Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
20833 A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
20808 Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20835 Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
20836 The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
20837 Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
21679 When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5971 Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]