Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bernard Williams, Empedocles and Quassim Cassam
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11 ideas
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
3238
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'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
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3239
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You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5673
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If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5670
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Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5671
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Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
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5672
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Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
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5675
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Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5674
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We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7946
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The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2181
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It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
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2176
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There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
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