Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bernard Williams, Georg Kreisel and Aristotle
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14 ideas
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
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3238
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'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
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3239
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You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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22528
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The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
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571
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Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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7946
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The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
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5266
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It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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8007
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Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
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12961
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For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
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4118
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A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
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22506
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A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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22504
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Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20192
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Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
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2181
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It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
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2176
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There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
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