Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Carneades, Pythagoras and Thomas Nagel
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9 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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3285
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We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
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3293
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If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
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3244
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Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
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3245
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The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
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3246
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I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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3292
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The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
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21671
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Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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21391
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Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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21674
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Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
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