Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Chrysippus, Georg W.F.Hegel and John Hawthorne
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16 ideas
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
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5647
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Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton]
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22770
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A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel]
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
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5648
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For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton]
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22788
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A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel]
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22792
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Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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21780
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A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
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22040
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Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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20833
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A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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20835
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Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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20808
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Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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20837
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Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
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20836
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The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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21679
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When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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5971
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Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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15617
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In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
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