Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) and Thomas Aquinas
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11 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
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9264
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Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
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9266
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A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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22111
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Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
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9267
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Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
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1855
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If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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1856
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Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
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1862
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However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
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1849
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Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
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1861
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The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
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1853
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Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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1854
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We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
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