Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hecato, Epictetus and E.J. Lowe
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13 ideas
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
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Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
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If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
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It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
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Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
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All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
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23342
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Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
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23330
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Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
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Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
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Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
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If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
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