Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Plotinus, Jacques Lenfant and Thomas Nagel
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7 ideas
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
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If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
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3244
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Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
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3245
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The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus]
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
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I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
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