Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Allan Gibbard and Daniel C. Dennett

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3 ideas

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: How could you make a robot conscious? The answer, I think, is to be found in software.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to strong AI, though Dennett is keen to point out that brains are the only plausible implementation of such software. Most find his claim baffling.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All varieties of functionalism can be viewed as 'homuncular' functionalism of one grain size or another.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 9.2)
     A reaction: This seems right, as any huge and complex mechanism (like a moon rocket) will be made up of some main systems, then sub-systems, then sub-sub-sub.... This assumes that there are one or two overarching purposes, which there are in people.
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
     Full Idea: We are descended from robots, and composed of robots, and all the intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of billions of crude intentional systems.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A more grand view of intentionality (such as Searle's) seems more attractive than this, but the crucial fact about Dennett is that he takes the implications of evolution much more seriously than other philosophers. He's probably right.