Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Frank Jackson and Metrodorus (Lamp)

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

---

6 ideas

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

6976	In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
	Full Idea: Physicalism is associated with various asymmetry doctrines, most famously with the idea that the psychological depends in some sense on the physical, and not the other way around.
	From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1)
	A reaction: Sounds okay to me. Shadows depend on objects, and not the other way round. It might suggest properties depending on substances (or bare particulars), but I prefer the dependence of processes on mechanisms (waterfalls on liquid water).

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

6986	Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
	Full Idea: Should the necessary passage from the physical account of the world to the psychological one that physicalists are committed to, be placed in the a posteriori or the a priori basket?
	From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)
	A reaction: That is, is 'the physical entails the mental' empirical or a priori? See Idea 3989. If we can at least dream of substance dualism, it is hard to see how it could be fully a priori. I think I prefer to see it as an inductive explanation.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

6992	If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
	Full Idea: It would be strange if having learnt the lesson of multiple realisability that the same role may be filled by different states, we turned around and insisted that the converse - different roles filled by the same state - is impossible.
	From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4 n3)
	A reaction: Good. The world is full of creatures who seem to enjoy the smell of decay etc. Some people (not me) like horror films. The separation of qualia and role leaves type-type physicalism as a possibility. Survival needs similar roles, not similar qualia.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument

7880	If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
	Full Idea: An ornithological Mary might know everything theoretical about kestrels, but be blind from birth, then have her sight restored. She now knows "That bird eats mice", so visual kestrels must be ontologically distinct from theoretical ones.
	From: comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 6.3
	A reaction: A nice reductio, and I think this pinpoints best what is wrong with the knowledge argument. Knowledge, and the means of acquiring it, are two distinct things. When I see x, I don't acquire knowledge of x, AND knowledge of my seeing x.

7378	No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
	Full Idea: That Mary "has all the physical information" is not readily imaginable, so no one bothers. They just imagine she knows lots and lots - perhaps everything known today - but that is just a drop in the bucket.
	From: comment on Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 12.5
	A reaction: I certainly don't see how we can rule out a priori the possibility that someone who really had all the physical knowledge might be able to infer the phenomenal properties of colour.

7377	Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
	Full Idea: It seems obvious that Mary will learn something about the world when she is released from her black-and-white room; but then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete; she had all the physical information, so there is more to have.
	From: Frank Jackson (Epiphenomenal Qualia [1982], §1)
	A reaction: This is Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument', which seems to me misconceived. Since I don't think phenomenal colours are properties of objects (Idea 5456), Mary learns more about herself, and about her means of acquiring knowledge.