Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, DH Mellor / T Crane and Gilbert Harman

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


2 ideas

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
     Full Idea: If the right pattern of electrical discharges occurred in a cloud instead of in a brain, would that also be a headache?
     From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.2)
     A reaction: The standard objection to functionalism is to propose absurd implementations of a mind, but probably only a brain could produce the right electro-chemical combination.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
     Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science.
     From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203)
     A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist?