Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Crispin Wright and E.J. Lowe

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2 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The vulgar notion, propagated by some modern physicalist philosophers, that Cartesian souls are supposed to be made of some sort of ghostly, 'immaterial' stuff - a near contradiction in terms - is quite unwarranted.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
     A reaction: A nice illustration of the service which can be offered by this database. See Idea 3423 for an illustration of the sort of thing which Lowe is attacking. See Idea 5011 for a quotation from Descartes on the subject. I leave the decision with my visitor...
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The idea that 'qualia' exist but are causally inert is difficult to sustain: for if they are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
     From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
     A reaction: The brain might be a special case. I can't know about a 'causally inert' object in my kitchen, but I might know about it if in some way I AM that object. Personally, though, I think everything that exists is causally active.