display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
Full Idea: A central tenet of functionalism is that objects can be dispositionally indiscernible but differ qualitatively as much as you please. | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 11.3) | |
A reaction: This refers to the multiple realisability of functions. Presumably we reconcile essentialism with the functionalist view by saying that dispositions result from combinations of qualities. A unique combination of qualities will necessitate a disposition. |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
Full Idea: Although your heart is a material object, the property of being a heart is, if we accept the functionalist picture, not a material property. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably functional properties are not physical because they are multiply realisable. The property of being a heart is more like a theoretical flow diagram than it is like a muscle. That word 'property' again… |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
Full Idea: If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: The problem is not that qualia must be denied, but that there is strong pressure to class them as epiphenomena. However, a raw colour can have a causal role (e.g. in an art gallery). Best to say (with Chalmers?) that functions cause qualia? |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
Full Idea: Functionalism has been widely criticized on the grounds that it is implausible to think that functional organization alone could suffice for conscious experience. | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.2) | |
A reaction: He cites Block's 'Chinese Mind' as an example. The obvious reply is that you can't explain consciousness with a lump of meat, or with behaviour, or with an anomalous property, or even with a non-physical substance. |