Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Immanuel Kant, Keith Campbell and Owen Flanagan

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4 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant]
     Full Idea: The three usual systems (really the only possible ones) for the community between soul and body are physical influence, preestablished harmony, and supernatural assistance.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B406-/A390)
     A reaction: This summarises the views of Descartes, Leibniz and Malebranche. Kant is not committing himself to dualism here. He didn't think of epiphenomenalism, or property dualism. And the 'community' could just be a coincidence…
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant]
     Full Idea: Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B827/A799)
     A reaction: This nicely pinpoints a well-known problem with the dualist theory of mind.
Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant]
     Full Idea: If materialism will not explain my existence, then spiritualism is just as unsatisfactory, and the conclusion is that in no way can we cognise anything about the constitution of our soul that concerns its possible separate existence.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B420)
     A reaction: This is Kant's refusal to deal with the mind-body relation, because the mind and its identity have a 'transcendental' status. I.e. they are unavoidable presuppositions about which nothing can be asked. I don't think I agree with him. I'm a materialist.
People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
     Full Idea: I would say that that my consciousness doesn't seem either physical or non-physical, ..but the belief that the mind is non-physical partly took hold because that fits well with thinking of human agents as free.
     From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.102)
     A reaction: I think this is right. I personally think there is no such thing as free will, and that belief in it has been the single greatest delusion amongst philosophers (and others) for the last two thousand years. Dualism has now gone, and free will is next.