display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
23222 | A soul with physical extension is more likely than an immaterial soul that moves bodies [Elizabeth] |
Full Idea: I would find it easier to concede matter and extension to the soul than to concede that an immaterial thing could move and be moved by a body. | |
From: Elizabeth, Princess of Bohemia (Letters to Descartes [1643], p.42), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2 | |
A reaction: Very nicely expressed! I'm trying to imagine a ghost which finds itself stuck with a physical body which it has to drag around like a reluctant dog. She is stating the classic interaction problem which plagues all mind-body dualism. |
3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
Full Idea: Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3 |
8462 | A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine] |
Full Idea: A physical ontology has a place for states of mind. An inspiration or a hallucination can, like the fit of ague, be identified with its host for the duration. It leaves our mentalistic idioms fairly intact, but reconciles them with a physical ontology. | |
From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI) | |
A reaction: Quine is employing the same strategy that he uses for substances and properties (Idea 8461): take the predication as basic, rather than reifying the thing being predicated. The ague analogy suggests that Quine is an incipient functionalist. |