display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I argue that (contrary to the doctrine called "anomalous monism") there is no good reason to doubt that there are intentional causal laws. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.151) | |
A reaction: I certainly can't see a good argument, in Davidson or anywhere else, to demonstrate their impossibility. Give the complexity of the brain, they would be like the 'laws' for weather or geology. |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Compare Churchland's strategy rooted in neurological modelling with "if it's flight you want to understand, what you need to look at is feathers". | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Sounds good, but may be a false analogy. You learn a lot about snake movement if you examine their scales. |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
Full Idea: Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level. | |
From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82 | |
A reaction: I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931). |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mind/brain supervenience is the best idea anyone has had so far about how mental causation is possible. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 30) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that mind brain identity was a much better idea (see Idea 3440). Supervenience seems to prove that 'mental causation' occurs, but doesn't explain it. |