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7645
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When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
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Full Idea:
The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought.
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From:
Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6)
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A reaction:
A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem.
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8462
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A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
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Full Idea:
A physical ontology has a place for states of mind. An inspiration or a hallucination can, like the fit of ague, be identified with its host for the duration. It leaves our mentalistic idioms fairly intact, but reconciles them with a physical ontology.
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From:
Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI)
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A reaction:
Quine is employing the same strategy that he uses for substances and properties (Idea 8461): take the predication as basic, rather than reifying the thing being predicated. The ague analogy suggests that Quine is an incipient functionalist.
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