display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
Full Idea: Since Cartesian dualism implies causation from outside of the physical domain, this means there can be no complete physical theory of the physical domain. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.147) | |
A reaction: This, I think, should be taken as a very strong argument against dualism, rather than as bad news for physics. Some exception might make the closure of physics impossible, but the claim that our brain is the exception looks highly suspect. |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
Full Idea: If epiphenomenalism were true, it would be a mystery how such things could be known to us. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.130) | |
A reaction: If a brain were asked whether it was conscious, it would presumably say 'yes', but (if epiphenomenalism were true) the cause of that would have to be brain events, and NOT information that it is conscious, which the brain could not have. Big objection. |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers doubt the coherence of the very idea of inverted or absent qualia. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115) | |
A reaction: The possibility of inverted qualia with identical brain structures strikes me as nil, but it would be odd to deny that qualia could be changed by brain surgery, given that insects can see ultra-violet, and some people are colourblind. |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
Full Idea: Is there anything about the qualitative characters of mental states which, should we come to know it, would convince us that zombies and qualia inversion are not really possible? | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171) | |
A reaction: The issue is what causes the qualitative states, not their 'characters'. This strikes me as falling into the trap of thinking that 'what it is like to be..' is a crucial issue. I think zombies are impossible, but not because I experience redness. |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Its inability to explain the possibility of "mental causation" doomed Cartesian dualism. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 4) | |
A reaction: This is a modern way of stating the interaction problem. Personally I am inclined to think that dualism was doomed by the spread of the scientific materialist view to every other corner of our knowledge except the mind. Plenty of causes baffle us. |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
Full Idea: In the formation of thoughts all parts of the body seem to me to be working together. | |
From: Novalis (Last Fragments [1800], 20) | |
A reaction: I can only think that Spinoza must be behind this thought, or La Mettrie. It seems a strikingly unusual intuition for its time, when almost everyone takes a spiritual sort of dualism for granted. |