display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
| 3400 | Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi] |
| Full Idea: If you are no larger than a point, how are you joined to the whole body, which is so large? …and there can be no intermingling between things unless the parts of them can be intermingled. | |
| From: Pierre Gassendi (Objections to 'Meditations' (Fifth) [1641]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.131 | |
| A reaction: As Descartes says that mind is distinct from body because it is non-spatial, it doesn't seem quite right to describe it as a 'point', but the second half is a real problem. Being non-spatial is a real impediment to intermingling with spatial objects. |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another. |