Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Archimedes, Ullin T. Place and Jerry A. Fodor
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22 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
2446
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Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
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2445
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Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
2599
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Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3001
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Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2467
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Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
2993
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Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
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12632
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In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
3011
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Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
5498
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Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2597
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Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2489
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Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
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2985
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Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2995
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Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
2464
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Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2490
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Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
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12624
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Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
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2991
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Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
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2447
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Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
3002
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If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2598
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Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
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3981
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Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
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