Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Benjamin Constant, Mary Astell and Jerry A. Fodor

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22 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
2446 Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
2445 Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
2599 Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3001 Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2467 Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
2993 Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
12632 In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
3011 Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
5498 Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2597 Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
2489 Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2995 Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
2464 Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
2468 Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2447 Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
2490 Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
12624 Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
2991 Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
3002 If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2598 Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]