Combining Philosophers

Ideas for David J.Chalmers, Owen Flanagan and Alfred North Whitehead

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18 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
2409 Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
2411 Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
2424 It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
2413 If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
5343 People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
5347 Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
2417 Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
2428 Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2418 The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
5339 Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2406 H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
2405 Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2395 Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
9318 Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
2404 Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
21834 Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5342 Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2429 Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]