Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Lynn Holt and Gilbert Ryle
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21 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
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2620
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Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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2388
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Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
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3354
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You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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2387
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How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
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4983
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There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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3529
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Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
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3964
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If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
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2307
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Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
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5497
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Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
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4081
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Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
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2321
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If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
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3404
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Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
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3963
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There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
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3965
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Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
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3961
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Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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3405
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If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
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3966
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The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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16041
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Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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6620
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Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
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6383
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Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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3429
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Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
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