Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Gottfried Leibniz, David H. Sanford and David J.Chalmers
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26 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
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19409
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Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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2409
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Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
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2411
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Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
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5510
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Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
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12760
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Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
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2424
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It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
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12698
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Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
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5025
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Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
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7564
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Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
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5038
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Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz]
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2596
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Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz]
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5046
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The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz]
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19350
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We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
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19421
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Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
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19351
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Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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12727
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It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]
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2413
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If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
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2417
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Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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2428
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Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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2405
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Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2395
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Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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9318
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Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
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2404
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Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
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