Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harré,R./Madden,E.H., Chrysippus and John Searle
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29 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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3469
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Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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3487
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Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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3458
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Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
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3485
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Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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3461
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Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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2427
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Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
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7389
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A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
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7390
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If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
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3496
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A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
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5789
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I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
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3501
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If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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5798
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Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
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3455
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Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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5787
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There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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3476
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Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
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3477
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If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
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3531
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Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
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3478
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Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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3466
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Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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5797
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The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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3500
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Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
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9317
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Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
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3474
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If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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5796
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If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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3497
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If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
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