Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harré,R./Madden,E.H., Chrysippus and John Searle
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11 ideas
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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5798
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Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
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3455
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Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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5787
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There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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3476
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Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
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3477
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If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
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3531
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Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
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3478
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Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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3466
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Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
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