Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, David Papineau and Julio Cesare Vanini
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8 ideas
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3515
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Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
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7892
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The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7879
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Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
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20971
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Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
7856
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It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
7881
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Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3512
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If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
7866
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Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
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