Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hippolytus, G Edelman / G Tononi and David Lewis
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9 ideas
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7441
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Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis]
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7442
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'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis]
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7444
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Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7445
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The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
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3994
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Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
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8579
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Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3989
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I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7443
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A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
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4933
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Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi]
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