Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Iris Marion Young, Deborah Achtenberg and David M. Armstrong
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8 ideas
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
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Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
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If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
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Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
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Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
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A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
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