Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, D.H. Mellor and Jaegwon Kim
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18 ideas
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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2464
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Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
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3374
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Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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3433
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The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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3377
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Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
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2991
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Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
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2447
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Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
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2490
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Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
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12624
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Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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3438
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Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
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3440
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Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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2308
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Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
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3002
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If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
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2598
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Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
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3981
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Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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2327
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Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
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3375
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If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
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