Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Henry Laycock and Paul M. Churchland
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11 ideas
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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2464
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Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
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2468
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Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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4988
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Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
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4987
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Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
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2447
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Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
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2490
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Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
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12624
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Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
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2991
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Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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3002
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If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2598
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Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
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3981
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Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
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