Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, E.J. Lowe and Hilary Putnam
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
25 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
|
8289
|
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
|
6625
|
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
|
2590
|
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
|
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
|
3460
|
Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
|
|
2591
|
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
|
|
6621
|
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
|
2589
|
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
|
|
2592
|
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
|
|
2588
|
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
|
5495
|
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
|
|
2331
|
Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
|
6654
|
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
|
2332
|
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
|
|
6629
|
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
|
|
2071
|
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
|
|
6623
|
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
|
|
6628
|
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
|
|
2348
|
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
|
2587
|
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
|
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
|
6634
|
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
|
2344
|
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
|
|
6630
|
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
|
6376
|
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
|
|
2330
|
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
|