Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Protagoras, Menedemus and Daniel C. Dennett
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
16 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
|
7379
|
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
|
7365
|
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
|
3159
|
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
|
|
3796
|
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
|
|
3161
|
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]
|
|
3986
|
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
|
2530
|
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
|
7371
|
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett]
|
|
4875
|
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
|
4879
|
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
|
7657
|
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
|
7366
|
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
|
|
7380
|
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
|
|
4876
|
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
|
|
7656
|
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
|
4878
|
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
|