Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Pythagoras, Cleanthes and Hilary Putnam
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17 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
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6028
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Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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2590
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Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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3460
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Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
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2591
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Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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2588
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Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
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2592
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Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
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2589
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Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
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5495
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Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
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2331
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Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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2348
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Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
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2332
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Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
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2071
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If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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2587
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Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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20831
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The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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2344
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If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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6376
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Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
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2330
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If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
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