Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Stephen P. Stich, Willard Quine and Jaegwon Kim
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39 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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3409
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Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
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3399
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If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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3390
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Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
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3414
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What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
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3359
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Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
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3369
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Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
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3428
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Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
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3380
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Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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3371
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Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
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3372
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Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
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3373
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Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
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3370
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What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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3379
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Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
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2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
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3388
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Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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3384
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The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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3393
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How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
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3439
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Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
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3427
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Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
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2314
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Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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3376
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We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
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3424
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Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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2313
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Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
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2328
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The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2309
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Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
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3362
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Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
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3413
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Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
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2311
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Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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3374
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Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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3433
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The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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3131
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Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
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3377
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Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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3438
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Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
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3440
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Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
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8462
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A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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2308
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Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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2327
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Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
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3375
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If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
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