Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Tyler Burge, N.L. Wilson and E.J. Lowe
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11 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
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8289
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The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
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6625
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If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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6621
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You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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8131
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Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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6654
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A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
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6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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6634
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Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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6630
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Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
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