display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
| 18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it, and lasts as long as the expression. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B VIII) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an outmoded view of thought, which modern cognitive science has undermined, by showing how little of our thinking is actually conscious. |
| 23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The correct explanation of the form of the proposition 'A judges p' must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition). | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5422) | |
| A reaction: In Notebooks p.96 LW gives the example 'this table penholders the book'. I take it Russell wanted judgement to impose unified meaning on sentences, but LW shows that assembling meaning must precede judgement. LW is right. |
| 4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §580) | |
| A reaction: Why do processes need 'criteria'? I have never understood why I can't have private criteria, or at least private modifications of public criteria. |
| 6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. Answer: if everything can accord with the rule, then everything can conflict with it, so there is no accord or conflict. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §201) | |
| A reaction: This is a very interesting claim which goes beyond the private language question. It seems to imply, for example, Dancy's 'Particularism' about morality, which is a general rejection of rules and principles in moral thought. |
| 4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: 'Obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §202) | |
| A reaction: The core of the Private Language argument. But if I drive on the right erroneously thinking it is the law, I can still make progress until I meet someone. |
| 7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The problem facing a putative private language-user - namely, that he cannot tell whether he is, or only thinks he is, following a rule - also faces the community as a whole; how does the community tell whether it is following a rule? | |
| From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §580) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Nice question. If you really get into the sceptical frame of mind that Wittgenstein reached about rules, almost everything seems impossible. How can I move? How can I speak? How can one instant follow another? How can I understand a word? |