display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
Full Idea: How else, other than via some form of representational system, could a human organism contain information as a content over which it could operate or 'attitudinise'? | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'representational'. In its vaguest sense, this is just a tautology - content must be held in the mind in some form or other, but that tells us nothing. |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to employ our folk psychology in the understanding of persons in a very different culture. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.241) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a highly significant problem for the friends of folk psychology. It also breaks down in extreme situations, or with mental illness. It seems closer to culture than to brain structure. |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
Full Idea: I cannot say I am simply thinking but not thinking about anything. | |
From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hard to disagree. However, I can plausibly reply to 'What are you thinking?' with 'Nothing', if my consciousness is freewheeling. Utterly disconnected content isn't really what we call 'thinking'. |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
Full Idea: The content of thought can either be expressed as satisfaction conditions (e.g. truth-conditions for beliefs), or as the exercise of at least two concepts. | |
From: report of Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: I think I favour the first view, because not all conjunctions of concepts would count as thoughts (e.g. rhubarb-plus-contradiction). A bunch of concepts becomes a thought when it connects in some way to reality? |