Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Daniel Statman and John Rawls

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4 ideas

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: The new kind of abstract objects are not creations of the human mind. ...The existence of such objects depends upon whether or not the relevant equivalence relation holds among the entities of the presupposed kind.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2)
     A reaction: It seems odd that we no longer have any choice about what abstract objects we use, and that we can't evade them if the objects exist, and can't have them if the objects don't exist - and presumably destruction of the objects kills the concept?
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: An example of a first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines; a higher-order example (which refers to first-order predicates) defines 'equinumeral' in terms of one-to-one correlation (Hume's Principle).
     From: B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the way modern logicians now treat abstraction, but abstraction principles include the elusive concept of 'equivalence' of entities, which may be no more than that the same adjective ('parallel') can be applied to them.
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: Abstractionism needs a face-value, existentially committed reading of the terms occurring on the left-hand sides together with sameness of truth-conditions across the biconditional.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §5)
     A reaction: They employ 'abstractionism' to mean their logical Fregean strategy for defining abstractions, not to mean the older psychological account. Thus the truth-conditions for being 'parallel' and for having the 'same direction' must be consistent.
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: Abstraction principles purport to introduce fundamental means of reference to a range of objects, to which there is accordingly no presumption that we have any prior or independent means of reference.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §8)
     A reaction: There's the rub! They make it sound like a virtue, that we open up yet another heaven of abstract toys to play with. As fictions, they are indeed exciting new fun. As platonic discoveries they strike me as Cloud-Cuckoo Land.