Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Crispin Wright, Anon (Upan) and Pierre Simon de Laplace

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4 ideas

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: Before we can conclude that φ expresses a sortal concept, we need to ensure that 'is the same φ as' generates statements of genuine identity rather than of some other equivalence relation.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i)
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: A concept is 'sortal' if it exemplifies a kind of object. ..In English predication of a sortal concept needs an indefinite article ('an' elm). ..What really constitutes the distinction is that it involves grasping identity for things which fall under it.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i)
     A reaction: This is a key notion, which underlies the claims of 'sortal essentialism' (see David Wiggins).
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: 'Tree' is not a sortal concept under which directions fall since we cannot adequately explain the truth-conditions of any identity statement involving a pair of tree-denoting singular terms by appealing to facts to do with parallelism between lines.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xiv)
     A reaction: The idea seems to be that these two fall under 'hedgehog', because that is a respect in which they are identical. I like to notion of explanation as a part of this.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)]
     Full Idea: If there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant.
     From: Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
     A reaction: This could stand as the epigraph for the whole of modern philosophy of language. However, the text goes on to say that mind is higher than speech. The test question is the mental capabilities of animals. Do they 'know' pleasure, or truth?