display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
Full Idea: To know, believe, hope, or fear that A, one must grasp the thought that A. In contrast, to fail to know, believe, hope or fear that A, one need not grasp the thought that A. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.3 c) | |
A reaction: A simple point, which at least shows that propositional attitudes are a two-stage operation. |
3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
Full Idea: Propositional attitudes divide into two broad types: neutral informational ones (belief, suspicion, imagining), and directional ones which motivate an agent (preference, desire, hate). | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: Since suspicions are motivating, and preferences are informational, this is not a very sharp distinction. An alternative would be to say that there is one type, and sometimes the will gets involved. |