Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Roger Scruton and Gregory Currie

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3 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
     Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17)
     A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest.
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12)
     A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19)
     A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify.