display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
Full Idea: You can entertain thoughts of things like tomatoes without a grasp of what they are. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.10) | |
A reaction: Lowe seemed to think that you had to grasp the generic essence of a tomato before you could think about it, but I agree entirely with Heil. |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
Full Idea: A fierce debate has raged between proponents of 'pictorial' conceptions of imagery (Kosslyn) and those who take imagery to be propositional (Pylyshyn). | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This may not be a simple dilemma. Pure pictorial imagery seem possible (abstract patterns) and pure propositions are okay (maths), but in most thought they are inextricable. The image is the proposition (a nuclear cloud). |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology and neuroscience are not competitors, any more than cartography and geology are competitors. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems true enough, unless someone like Fodor claims that the correct way to do neuroscience is to try to explicate folk psychology categories in terms of brain function. Folk psychology is fine for folk. |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
Full Idea: Thinking - ordinary conscious thinking - is imagistic. This is so for 'linguistic' or 'sentential' thoughts as well as for patently non-linguistic thoughts. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10) | |
A reaction: This claim (that linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought) strikes me as an excellent insight. |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
Full Idea: Non-conscious thought need not resemble conscious thought occurring out of sight. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10) |
18424 | If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation. | |
From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2 | |
A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical. |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
Full Idea: Some externalists focus on causal-historical connections, others emphasise social matters (especially thinkers' linguistic communities), still others focus on biological function. | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 18.5 n6) | |
A reaction: Helpful. The social view strikes me as the one to take most seriously (allowing for contextual views of justification, and for the social role of experts). The problem is to combine the social view with realism and a robust view of truth. |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
Full Idea: I suggest that intentionality is grounded in the dispositionalities of agents. Dispositions are intrinsic to agents, so this places me on the side of the internalists and against the externalists. | |
From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 18.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is a key idea, and the right view. The key question is whether we see intentionality as active or passive. The externalist view seems to see the brain as a passive organ which the world manipulates. If the brain is active, what is it doing? |