display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
14 ideas
19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The passions of monads reside in their confused perceptions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Remond de Montmort [1715], 1715) | |
A reaction: He thinks perceptions come in degrees of confusion, all the way up to God, who alone has fully clear perceptions. He blames in on these confused perceptions. |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Every feeling is the perception of a truth. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I wouldn't say feelings ARE perceptions of truths, but I might say that every experience we have has an intellectual dimension as well as an emotional one. Our beliefs drift and solidify in just the same way that feelings do. |
19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: What I mean by an idea is not a certain act of thinking, but a power or faculty such that we have an idea of a thing even if we are not thinking about it but know that we can think it when the occasion arises. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (What is an Idea? [1676], p.281) | |
A reaction: 'Idea' tends to be used in the seventeenth century to mean an actual mental event. It is because Leibniz believes in the unconscious mind that he can offer this rather different, and probably superior, notion of an 'idea'. |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |
A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is an immediate inner object, which expresses the nature or qualities of things, ..but since it is the object of thought it can exist before and after the thoughts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: This sounds something like Frege's 'third realm' between mind and world (Idea 7740). Notice that Leibniz is also using the word 'object' in this context. Leibniz doesn't make the mistake of confusing concepts and images, as many did. |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is essential to distinguish images from exact ideas which are composed of definitions. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.09) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12615, which is attacking Descartes and Locke, I think, but fails to register that Spinoza and Leibniz had got the notion of an 'idea' much more clearly. |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: I distinguish ideas from thoughts. For we always have all our pure or distinct ideas independently of the senses, but thoughts always correspond to some sensation. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.01) | |
A reaction: Leibniz's concept of an 'idea' is quite different from the empiricist notion of them, and strikes me as being much closer to Frege's notion of a concept. On the whole I like the Leibniz account best. |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that green comes from a mixture of blue and yellow; which makes it credible that the idea of green is composed of the ideas of those two colours, although the idea of green appears to us as simple as that of blue. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.07) | |
A reaction: This shows the use of 'idea' at that time for non-verbal mental events and concepts. Ideas are not, then, just undestood as phenomena, but can be analysed and explained more deeply. |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The name 'gold' signifies not merely what the speaker knows of gold , but also what he does not know, which may be known by someone else: an inner constitution from which flow colour and weight, and generates other properties. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.11) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Thus in the course of defending true essences of gold (against Locke's claim that we are stuck with the nominal essence), Leibniz drifts into an externalist account of meaning. He mentions experts, as so often does Putnam. |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The name 'gold' signifies not only what he who pronounces it knows about it, for example, something very heavy and yellow, but also what he does not know, and that another can know about it, its internal constitution from which colour and weight flow. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 6.6.354), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz and Locke on Essences | |
A reaction: Leibniz goes on to use the word 'expert'. This isn't just a hint of Putnam's externalism about concepts like 'water' - it is a clear spelling out of the full idea. Locke would have been astounded by 'atomic number 79', and Leibniz would be, like, 'yeah'. |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There must always be some basis for the connexion between the terms of a proposition, and it is to be found in their concepts. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14 X) | |
A reaction: We face the problem that bothered Russell, of the unity of the proposition. We are also led to the question of HOW our concepts connect the parts of a proposition. Do concepts have valencies? Are they incomplete, as Frege suggests? |
19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Leibniz understood concepts as corresponding to eternal possibilities, with both concepts and their ordering having their foundation in the divine mind. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 2 'Nominalism' | |
A reaction: It is is no longer the fashion to think of concepts as 'ordered', and yet there is a multitude of dependence relations between them. |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: You assert that the notion of substance is formed from concepts, and not from things. But are not concepts themselves formed from things? | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.06.23), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 5.7 | |
A reaction: A nice remark, which is true even of highly abstruse, abstract or fanciful concepts. You are still left with the question of how far away from reality you have moved when you construct things from your reality-based concepts. |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In forming universals the soul only abstracts certain circumstances by concealing innumerable others. ..A spherical body complete in all respects is nowhere in nature; the soul forms such a notion by concealing aberrations. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's affirmation of traditional 'abstraction by ignoring', which everyone seems to have believed in before Frege, and which I personally think is simply correct, even though it is deeply unfashionable and I keep it to myself. |