Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Iris Marion Young, Crispin Wright and Harold Joachim

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


3 ideas

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: Before we can conclude that φ expresses a sortal concept, we need to ensure that 'is the same φ as' generates statements of genuine identity rather than of some other equivalence relation.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i)
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: A concept is 'sortal' if it exemplifies a kind of object. ..In English predication of a sortal concept needs an indefinite article ('an' elm). ..What really constitutes the distinction is that it involves grasping identity for things which fall under it.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i)
     A reaction: This is a key notion, which underlies the claims of 'sortal essentialism' (see David Wiggins).
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: 'Tree' is not a sortal concept under which directions fall since we cannot adequately explain the truth-conditions of any identity statement involving a pair of tree-denoting singular terms by appealing to facts to do with parallelism between lines.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xiv)
     A reaction: The idea seems to be that these two fall under 'hedgehog', because that is a respect in which they are identical. I like to notion of explanation as a part of this.