Combining Philosophers

Ideas for John Rawls, Anil Seth and Gilbert Harman

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4 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
6951 Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
     Full Idea: Ordinary rationality is generally conservative, in the sense that you start from where you are, with your present beliefs and intentions.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.3)
     A reaction: This stands opposed to the Cartesian or philosophers' rationality, which requires that (where possible) everything be proved from scratch. Harman seems right, that the normal onus of proof is on changing beliefs, rather proving you should retain them.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3086 Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
     Full Idea: The theory of language-independent meanings or semantic representations is mistaken.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.5)
     A reaction: This would make him (in Dummett's terms) a 'philosopher of language' rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Personally I disagree. Don't animals have 'meanings'? Can two sentences share a meaning?
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
23518 Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth]
     Full Idea: Much of today's AI is best described as sophisticated machine-based pattern recognition.
     From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], IV.13)
     A reaction: Personally I wouldn't want to underestimate the extent to which human intelligence is also pattern recognition (across time as well as in space).
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
     Full Idea: Concepts and other aspects of mental representation have content but not (normally) meaning (unless they are also expressions in a language used in communication).
     From: Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.2)
     A reaction: Given his account of meaning as involving some complex 'role', he has to say this, though it seems a dubious distinction, going against the grain of a normal request to ask what some concept 'means'. What is 'democracy'?