Combining Philosophers

Ideas for La Mettrie, Willard Quine and M Fitting/R Mendelsohn

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4 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33)
     A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34)
     A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are language [Quine]
     Full Idea: Concepts are language.
     From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 5)
     A reaction: Hm. This seems to mean that animals and pre-linguistic children have no concepts. I just don't believe that.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
     Full Idea: Applying the operator '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, we get second-level abstract singular terms.
     From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 5)
     A reaction: This is the derivation of abstract concepts by naming classes, rather than by deriving equivalence classes. Any theory which doesn't allow multi-level abstraction is self-evidently hopeless. Quine says Frege and Russell get numbers this way.